The Best Way To Beat A NBA Buzzer Is The One That Works

This article is part of VICE Sports' 2016 NBA Playoffs coverage.

"That's the play you called out of a timeout?" — Everyone watching the end of regulation of Game 2 of the Miami Heat-Toronto Raptors NBA Playoffs series, simultaneously.

There is nothing quite so mythic as a buzzer-beating game-winner in the NBA postseason. Such shots will be replayed endlessly over the years, in a million televised hype montages to come, earning their makers oversized reputations and nicknames to match: Big Shot Rob, Mr. Big Shot, Black Mamba. The omnipresence of these highlights conspires against the thing that makes these shots so valuable, which is that they are exceedingly rare.

Last-second game-winners are unlikely enough that we probably should pause before a) going HAM on social media about the latest coaching atrocity resulting in a botched end-game possession, like the aforementioned Heat-Raptors game, and b) anointing players with rose petals and snazzy monikers whenever they hit one.

The truth is, nobody—no player, no coach, no team—has proven to have much sustained success with end-of-game shooting, which in turn means that the two sides of the great last-second NBA debate, Draw Up a Great Play versus Clear Out For Hero Ball, both mostly amount to shouting into a wind tunnel.

End game shots are hard, in short, and there's no obvious way to make them easier.

Over the last 20 NBA regular seasons, shot attempts with under 30 seconds remaining in the fourth quarter or overtimethat could tie or take the lead in a game have gone in at a rate of 29.3 percent. That's not good! While a few of these shots have been hopeless three-quarter court heaves, that number is quite small given the number of timeouts teams have at their disposal, and has a negligible effect on overall percentages.

For all of the big shots that we remember and the sterling reputations of the players that made them, the numbers show that as those same players amass more and more end-game attempts, there is a strong tendency to converge towards that not-so-impressive average:

Looking at the above, you could argue that outliers such as Dirk Nowitzki and Carmelo Anthony are particularly well-suited to scoring in late game situations. Alternately, you could conclude that they've simply run hot over samples of fewer than 100 shots.

Similarly, the same 20-year period doesn't yield any obvious patterns in terms of end-game team performance. No team is more than a win per season up or down from expectation. In short, then, the baseline expectations for late-game play should be pretty low. If the shot is going in less than a third of a time, even the worst coach drawing up the most hapless play is costing his team a mere fraction of a hypothetical victory.

Certainly, the idea with any end-game possession is to "run something" that springs a player, preferably your best player, for an easy look. Of course, that's also true on most regular possessions. But end-game scenarios are different, and more difficult, for a number of reasons.

First, there's almost no element of surprise. In a normal possession, the offense has an edge in being able to select how, when, and by whom the shot will eventually be taken. In end-game possessions, however, the defense knows the shot is coming with little or no time left: though the calculations necessary to game out every possible scenario can become pretty involved, it's clear that leaving your opponent time to get a shot off when you have the ball and a chance to run the clock to 0:00 in a tie game is pretty devastating to your chances of winning. It's an overstatement, but not by much, to say that the most important thing in any shot-clock-off, tie-game scenario is to leave the clock at zero, whether you get a good shot or not.

A complex play involving several moving players working in concert is hard to pull off at any time. Add nerves and the above-mentioned time pressure, and it is quite easy to get everything bungled up. For example, the Atlanta Hawks didn't even get a shot off at the end of regulation in their Game Four first-round loss to the Boston Celtics. The play they called made sense: Paul Millsap setting a pindown for Kyle Korver, who in turn was to fake a ball screen for Jeff Teague at the top of the floor. Problem was, Millsap waited a beat too long to set the initial screen, meaning Korver was late coming to the top of the floor, meaning Teague was hung out to dry with the ball in his hands as the clock ticked down. Nobody missed by much, but the result was a mess.

Executing a play requiring that much precision is awfully tough. It's easy to say the Hawks and other teams should "practice more," but given that NBA teams have limited available in-season time, they can—and do—better spend that time on improving their overall schematic performance, and not the precise execution of last-second plays.

The other complicating end-game factor is the greater latitude given defenders to play more physically off the ball. NBA referees, perhaps understandably, have been conditioned not to want to "decide the outcome" of games by making a call away from the ball handler. A good example of this occurred near the end of Game 5 of the first-round series between Indiana and Toronto. On first viewing, this appeared a mystifying decision by the Pacers' Monta Ellis to go for the dreaded quick two-pointer while down three points—a choice that all too often is neither quick nor ends with a two-point basket. A closer look reveals the play was designed to be a "hammer" set for Indiana's Paul George in the opposite corner to Ellis's drive; however, the action was foiled by the Raptors' Norman Powell clutching, holding, bumping, and otherwise riding George's hip as the Pacers' star traversed the court. George was unable to get open, leaving Ellis with no choice but to force a contested runner.

In Major League, there's a moment where the Cleveland Indians' crusty manager decides that flamethrowing relief pitcher Charlie Sheen should forget about the curveball, and just give them the heater. Perhaps there's some unintentional (remember: we're talking about Charlie Sheen) wisdom there. It's easy to mock NBA teams and coaches for ugly, uncreative isolation plays at the end of games—but given all of the above, it's also easy to see why they sometimes put the ball in the hands of players like George, let them work, and hope for the best.

Of course, this isn't a cure-all, as the end of Miami-Toronto Game 2 made clear. Here's Raptors guard Kyle Lowry, with a great opportunity to attack with speed:

Instead of getting a good lock, Lowry ended up dribbling himself out of time and into a a no-chance fadeaway 27-footer:

While history suggests Lowry wasn't going work his way to a layup, an All-Star level point guard should manage to get something better. That, or a playoff team should manage to draw up something better. Or so the rest of us think. But odds are that the Raptors were going to miss either way, and maybe we all should keep that mind. After all, if game-ending shots were easy, the successful ones wouldn't be so memorable.