What the Hell Happened to the Nationals?

Entering Friday, the Washington Nationals had won three of four games, a modest span that included the team's first three-game win streak since mid-July, a sign perhaps that the preseason World Series favorites might be snapping out of their season-long slump. And then a 10-3 loss on Friday against the lowly Milwaukee Brewers had everyone asking the same questions they've asked all season.

How exactly did the Nats get to this point, where a three-game winning streak had felt significant? How did a team picked to dominate their division find themselves below .500 halfway into August, staring at a nearly five-game deficit in the standings behind the surprising New York Mets? What the hell happened?

The 2015 Nats were pegged as a team capable of winning 100 games, but their championship hopes always seemed a bit uncertain. The offense featured one injury risk after another, the bullpen had inexperienced players in unfamiliar roles, and manager Matt Williams hadn't yet proved himself ready to lead a championship-caliber team. There was plenty of risk with this Nats team.

Perhaps the biggest question was the team's health.

Ryan Zimmerman (hamstring) missed 100 games in 2014. Bryce Harper missed 60 games in 2014 (hand) and 40 games (knee) the previous year. Yunel Escobar (knee) had his own injury issues last year. Wilson Ramos hadn't played more than half a season since 2012.

The players who didn't miss significant time last year weren't great bets to play a full season this year. Jayson Werth missed a month in 2013 (hamstring) and half of 2012 (wrist); now he was entering his late 30s. Anthony Rendon was considered a big injury risk when he was drafted in 2011, and then he proceeded to miss most of the 2012 minor league season with a fractured left ankle. Denard Span lost a big chunk of 2011 and a week in 2014 with concussion symptoms. Additionally, both Span and Werth underwent offseason surgery in early January.

With six starters likely to miss time due to injury, putting together a deep bench would be paramount. The Nats took a risk here. They gambled on the displaced Danny Espinosa and the rookie Michael Taylor to be able to handle starting roles if needed. Beyond that, they bet on AAAA cast-off Clint Robinson, never-was former prospect Tyler Moore, and last-chance veteran Dan Uggla to perform if called upon. It was a very standard bench for a team with major injury concerns.

There was also reason to believe some players were regressing. Ramos's sheer accumulation of injuries may have played a role in a disappointing 2014. Ian Desmond, the player most likely to remain healthy all season, was seeing his offensive contributions consistently drop as he progressed through his late 20s. Slight regressions from Werth and Escobar could also be expected because of age.

The Nats also decided to gamble with their bullpen. Last year, the Nats pen featured a nearly unbeatable one-two punch of Drew Storen as the closer and Tyler Clippard as the set-up man. For much of the season, it was actually a shutdown trio, with Rafael Soriano pitching extremely well until a late collapse.

In the off-season, the Nats chose not to re-sign the free agent Soriano. They also traded Clippard for Escobar. The Nats planned on using young arms like Blake Treinen and Aaron Barrett, and veteran injury risk Casey Janssen, to possibly play big roles at the end of games. But that left a gap in the middle innings. Potentially exacerbating the issue was Williams's lack of experience as a manager. He had made some questionable bullpen decisions in last year's playoff loss to the San Francisco Giants. Could he be relied upon to manage a bullpen with these new pieces?

Presumably, the Nats didn't worry about their bullpen because the rotation seemed so reliable. Max Scherzer signed a seven-year, $210 million contract in late January. With Jordan Zimmermann and Stephen Strasburg, the Nats had three No. 1 starter types, none older than 30, who had missed only a handful of starts combined since 2011. That trio was followed up by two strong, reliable arms, Gio Gonzalez and Doug Fister. If Gonzalez continued to decline or Fister's luck turned, the Nats had Tanner Roark, who established himself as a strong starter, waiting in the wings.

The Nationals didn't seem willing to add salary to improve the team if something went wrong—another major gamble. This may be an odd criticism for a team paying out almost $165 million in salary this season, but there has always been an underlying question of how far the ownership's financial commitment would go. Last year, Nats ownership hinted at being "topped out" in payroll. The Scherzer contract was constructed in a way that spread the money out over a long period of time. Some observers felt that the Clippard deal and Jerry Blevins's trade to the Mets were made to save salary.

Entering spring training, the Nats were a flawed team with no money available to fix the flaws. Potentially they could be great, but everything would have to go right: the offense would have to stay healthy, the older players would need to stop regressing, the untested bullpen would have to pitch well, and Williams would need to use his relievers in the right spots.

This plan faltered almost as soon as spring training started. Span needed another surgery. Rendon hurt himself diving for a ball. Then the season began. Zimmerman suffered through plantar fasciitis. Rendon's return kept getting pushed back. Gonzalez regressed. Treinen and Barrett failed in key late-inning roles. Fister and Strasburg pitched poorly and were put on the DL. Werth broke his wrist.

Some things did go right. Scherzer pitched like a Cy Young candidate. Harper developed into an MVP candidate. Espinosa, Escobar, and Robinson performed well in increased roles. It was enough to get the Nats into first place.

Then it all fell apart again. Span, who came back in late April and performed well, got injured again. The players who had been performing well cooled down, and the players who hadn't been playing well continued to underperform. Desmond suffered through a terrible slump. Ramos and Taylor, now thrust into important roles, also slumped. The pitching staff, with a healthy and revitalized Strasburg, kept the team afloat, but then Strasburg went back to the DL. Zimmermann struggled. The bullpen issues were not resolved, and Williams continued to show no acumen on how to use his relievers anyway.

Desperate for help, the Nats reached the point where they needed to add players mid-season. They traded for Philadelphia reliever Jonathan Papelbon, who was immediately appointed the team's closer, a dubious move made to convince Papelbon to waive his no trade clause—and to have the Phillies pay the majority of his salary—considering the incumbent Storen had previously struggled when taken out of the closer role. Since his demotion, Storen has a 9.18 ERA.

To top it all, Werth and Rendon have struggled since their return from the DL, after forcing out two of the more effective Nats in the lineup, Espinosa and Robinson.

And yet, the Nats still have a chance to win the division. That's both a testament to the talent in place and to the weak NL East. An important series looms after Labor Day. By then we'll know whether the Nats have truly snapped out of that slump.