Breaking Down the Official Review of the Siege in Martin Place

The first official government review of the siege in Martin Place has been released. In its assessment of the interactions the perpetrator, Man Haron Monis, had with law enforcement and security agencies, the NSW Justice system, and various other institutions, it found that none of the above organisations were derelict in their duty, though it offers several recommendations for future changes.

Addressing Parliament this morning Prime Minister Tony Abbott said, "What we learnt from that review was that there were no major failings of intelligence or process in the lead up to Martin Place." However in comments released before the speech, he made the point that while there wasn't a single instance of failure, "Plainly, in their totality, the system has let us down."

The review was co-authored by the secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Michael Thawley, and the secretary of the New South Wales Department of Premier and Cabinet, Blair Comley. The story it tells of Monis, particularly of his encounters with ASIO and the AFP, is deeply strange.

ASIO investigated Monis more than once, he blipped off and on their radar over three separate decades, beginning with the application he filed from Iran for a one-month business visa in 1996. The interest was mutual. Once he was in Australia on a protection visa (and then as a citizen) Monis directly contacted ASIO on several occasions, mostly with offers to help.

He called them in May 1998 and claimed to have information about the Sydney Olympics. He contacted them again years later, this time claiming to have information regarding how the September 11 attacks were funded — he called on September 12 and during an interview regarding these claims he enquired whether US would reward him for his help. In 2006 he called ASIO and claimed to have urgent information regarding suicide bombers eight days after the London bombings. Upon receiving a meeting he offered a "hypothesis" he had developed that he wanted passed on to UK and US intelligence agencies.

All of his claims, from knowing people with material on Al Qaeda to having information about an Israeli airman who had been missing in action since 1986, were found to be not credible (or in the case of his information about the Sydney Olympics, not relevant).

In February of 2007 Monis tried a different tack. He called ASIO and offered his services as a source. He requested a meeting with ASIO and explained his recent decision to change his name from Michael Hayson Mavros was motivated by his desire to become a teacher of Islam in the community. He said he intended to teach Muslim youth in order to steer them away from terrorism, and that he would "temper his pro-Western views in order to connect". Finally, as outlined in a "three page plan", he offered his services as an ASIO source. The offer was declined.

After the meeting ASIO internally reconfirmed that contact with Monis should not be pursued. His information lacked security relevance, and his motivation for seeking contact was a concern.

The review found that neither ASIO nor any other law enforcement agency had come across "any information to indicate Monis had the intent or desire to commit a terrorist act." Due to his long history of attention-seeking behaviour the authors of the review were "alert to the possibility that ASIO or the police might actually have become complacent about or even dismissive of Monis." But they found "no evidence this was the case. Each time security or law enforcement agencies received new information, it was assessed against their broader intelligence holdings."

To many, particularly galling in the aftermath of the siege were the revelations that Monis was granted citizenship, that he was out on bail, and that he had received years of social welfare. In a Youtube video posted last week, Prime Minister Tony Abbott framed these decisions as amounting to giving Monis "the benefit of the doubt." This analysis isn't contained within the report.

For seven and a half years of his eighteen years in Australia Monis received some form of government-funded income. Throughout the years he was a recipient he was compliant with the programs – he reported looking for work, undertaking work experience, and attending training. Having received citizenship in 2004, he did all that was required to make him eligible.

His citizenship was delayed due to security concerns but was ultimately granted by Immigration with the approval of ASIO, they found no legal or security reasons for denying it. One of the recommendations of the review is that "Immigration should propose policy and legislative changes necessary to support decisions to grant or revoke an initial visa, subsequent visas and, citizenship".

By the time of the siege Monis was on bail for sexual assault charges and murder-related charges — being an accessory before and after the fact. For the latter he was granted bail because the court considered the Crown's case weak and circumstantial, it didn't appear Monis had ready access to any place to go overseas, and, if he was a threat anyone, it was to the woman who had been murdered. The review mentions Monis may have been treated differently if recent bail laws had been in effect. Amongst its recommendations with regards to bail is that links to violent extremism should be taken into account.

As reported by the Sydney Morning Herald, some legal experts consider the current laws sufficient, as they already take into account if the accused has terrorism links.

Considering he lacked connections to any wider organisation the question of whether or not it's appropriate to label Monis a terrorist has been debated. The portrait painted by this report is not so much of a terrorist as it is of a man enthralled by the idea of terrorism, and who keyed into the attention our society devotes to it.

During his life in Australia Monis claimed to have information that would stop terrorism, floated the idea of quashing radicalism as a teacher of Islam, offered to be a counter-terrorist source, blamed bushfires and Qantas mechanical failures on terrorism, called the AFP and NSW Police to tell them he was being hunted by terrorists, and videoed himself giving jihadist fatwas. He alternately played the part (or liked to think he was playing the part) of an eager-to-integrate asylum seeker, a spiritual healer and clairvoyant, and a radicalised jihadist sympathiser.

The review suggests Monis' path towards murder was not typical or straight; he was abnormal in more ways than one. It's not that there was any institutional or personal failure but that it was not possible to predict what Monis would do.

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