Inopportune Knocks: The Week in Self-Sabotage by NFL Coaches

In the NFL, teams only get a dozen or so possessions each game with which to score points. Unfortunately, most coaches never remember that until they've wasted most of them. In the fourth quarter, conservative-to-a-fault coaches who punted away points and dawdled minutes off the clock become desperate, reckless aggressors.

Every week at VICE Sports, Inopportune Knocks will take a hard look at first-half opportunities NFL teams passed up—sealing their second-half fates.

CAROLINA PANTHERS 20, JACKSONVILLE JAGUARS 9:

On the 20th anniversary of both teams' inception, the Jaguars hosted the Panthers in a season opener as critical as first-week,cross-conference matchups get.

Though Carolina has cracked the second round of the NFC playoffs for two years running, they presented the best chance Jacksonville had to avoid an 0-4 start. After Carolina, the Jags play the Miami Dolphins in Week 2, then visit the New England Patriots and Indianapolis Colts.

Unfortunately, meek decision-making by head coach Gus Bradley cost the Jaguars their best shot to take control of the game.

With 1:01 left in the first quarter, down 3-0, Jacksonville found itself on the Panthers' three-yard line. Having gone three-and-out with each of their first two possessions, the Jaguars faced the kind of classic opportunity-cost decision NFL coaches constantly get wrong.

Using now-ESPN analyst Brian Burke's Win Probability model, the Jaguars had a 69 percent chance of converting the field goal, and just a 15 percent chance of converting the touchdown:

Win Probability: 46 percent

Adjusted Win Probability: 37 percent

Touchdown likelihood: 39 percent

Field Goal likelihood: 69 percent

WP is based on aggregated recent NFL history, and so assumes average, nominal, all-else-equal conditions between two evenly matched teams. AWP factors in the gambling line as an indicator of team strength. As Bradley gets set to make his fateful choice, AWP suggests his three-point-underdog Jaguars have a 37 percent chance of winning.

A field goal attempt is much less likely to fail than going for a touchdown, and we know NFL coaches hate failure. But the cost of a missed field goal or turnover on downs in this situation is the same: the Panthers get the ball deep in their own territory, and the Jaguars' AWP drops to 29 percent. The upside, however, is wildly different: a touchdown bumps the Jaguars' AWP to 52 percent, while a successful field goal doesn't change it at all.

In other words, scoring a touchdown gives the underdogs better-than-even odds, but hitting the field goal doesn't make them any more likely to win.

Nevertheless, Bradley trots out rookie kicker Jason Meyers, an undrafted free agent who spent last year bouncing around the Arena Football League. Even the most hard-headed NFL coach shouldn't assume such a kicker is automatic from any distance; indeed Meyers would go on to miss both of his other two kick attempts. But at the end of the first, Bradley trusts the street free agent to hit a chip shot more than he trusts young franchise quarterback Blake Bortles to make a play.

The Jaguars only get two more red-zone opportunities the whole game. One ends early when Allen Hurns fumbles at the Carolina 17. The other? A Bortles touchdown pass from one yard out.

Yes, the Jaguars had other opportunities later, and yes, turnovers short-circuited later drives. But these are predictable events. If you make decisions assuming Bortles will protect the ball and score points in the second half, why not trust him to do so in the first?

GREEN BAY PACKERS 31, CHICAGO BEARS 23

The Bears were massive underdogs in this game with Green Bay favored by a touchdown despite the game being played in Chicago. But most of the first half played out as well as—or even better than—the Bears could have hoped. With 13 seconds left before halftime, they're tied 10-10 and sitting on the Packers' 32-yard line.

As the WP model shows, this is a great place to be:

Win Probability: 56 percent

Adjusted Win Probability: 42 percent

First Down likelihood: 34 percent

Touchdown likelihood: 23 percent

Field Goal likelihood: 32 percent

If these were two even teams, the Bears would be in the drivers' seat. As it is, they have a better shot to win than anybody ever expected: the seven point spread going in means the Bears had only a 24 percent chance of winning, and now they have an adjusted WP of 0.42!

But take a look at those other percentages. With NFL defenses in prevent mode, NFL offenses convert a first down 34 percent of the time. The Bears have no timeouts left, but more than enough time to take a shot down the sideline. If they throw incomplete, no problem. If they get 10-20 yards closer, the odds of success go way, way up.

In fact, let's look at those odds of success: a 50-yard field goal is a 1-in-3 shot, while the odds of hitting a 32-yard touchdown pass are better than 1:5, pushing 1:4. Kicking on third down can save you in the event of a bad snap, but how often does that happen? Very, very rarely, as Burke has previously written. Unless you're within the 10-yard line, kicking on third down just wastes a chance to make your kicker's job much easier. Plus, the Bears don't have a timeout left, anyway, so what's the deal?

John Fox chooses to send out Robbie Gould, which only makes sense if he believes Cutler is more likely to take a sack or throw a pick on one passing down than Gould is to miss a very difficult kick. As hardy-har-har as it is to suggest that's true at Cutler's expense, it isn't.

Gould does make it, and the Bears' adjusted win probability swells from 42 to 46 percent. But if, given two tries, they'd managed to score from the 32-yard line, the underdogs would have had carried a 17-10 lead (and a 59 percent AWP) into the locker room.

OPENING THE DOOR

The Miami Dolphins, five-point favorites over Washington, were surprisingly down 3-0 in the middle of the second quarter and struggling to move the ball. That's when they came up against a 4th-and-1 from Washington's 12-yard line. Joe Philbin and the Dolphins went for it. Per Burke's 4th-down calculator, which doesn't account for relative team strength but includes a few more wrinkles, this was a resoundingly good call.

Going for it succeeds 74 percent of the time from there, on the average, and converting would have given them a raw WP of 0.58, versus the 0.48 of a successful field goal. Even after failing, the Dolphins still had an adjusted WP of 0.56. This was a low-risk press of a huge talent advantage on one of just three red zone chances they'd get. They went on to win 17-10.

The Kansas City Chiefs opened as one-point underdogs against Houston on the road, and ended up one-point favorites. They made a couple huge plays, and caught a couple of huge breaks, racing out to a 17-6 lead.

Halfway through the second quarter, they came up on a 4th-and-8 at the Texans' 30-yard line. Initially, the Chiefs lined up go to for it—and Texans head coach Bill O'Brien was so stunned he called a timeout to set up his defense. But was it all that stunning?

According to the 4th-down calculator, the Chiefs had a 38 percent chance of picking up the eight yards and 62 percent chance of kicking the 48-yard field goal. The returns on those risks—three points, versus a situation that likely results in three points (but could also result in seven or no points)—nearly balance each other out.

Both the Win Probability and Expected Points model agreed: Kicking a likely field goal was the smartest play. However, the Chiefs were in such command of the game that going for it and failing (0.82 WPA) didn't leave them much worse off than kicking it and succeeding (0.90 WPA).

Chiefs head coach Andy Reid correctly perceived a near-total lack of risk in that situation. But once the element of surprise was lost, he made the optimal choice and went on to win, 27-20.